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Abstract
Background: The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 provided for the designation of a critical
infrastructure protection program. This ultimately led to the designation of emergency services as
a targeted critical infrastructure. In the context of an evolving crisis in hospital-based emergency
care, the extent to which federal funding has addressed disaster preparedness will be examined.
Discussion: After 9/11, federal plans, procedures and benchmarks were mandated to assure a
unified, comprehensive disaster response, ranging from local to federal activation of resources.
Nevertheless, insufficient federal funding has contributed to a long-standing counter-trend which
has eroded emergency medical care. The causes are complex and multifactorial, but they have
converged to present a severely overburdened system that regularly exceeds emergency capacity
and capabilities. This constant acute overcrowding, felt in communities all across the country,
indicates a nation at risk. Federal funding has not sufficiently prioritized the improvements
necessary for an emergency care infrastructure that is critical for an all hazards response to disaster
and terrorist emergencies.
Summary:  Currently, the nation is unable to meet presidential preparedness mandates for
emergency and disaster care. Federal funding strategies must therefore be re-prioritized and
targeted in a way that reasonably and consistently follows need.
Background
Many assumptions regarding the nation's need for disas-
ter preparedness were reassessed after 9/11. Among them
was a fuller appreciation of the fact that preparedness had
to include public health and hospital personnel in its first
responder definition. This significance was statutorily rec-
ognized with the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of
2002[1] which provided for the designation of a critical
infrastructure protection program. This subsequently led
to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-
7)[2] in 2003 which targeted emergency services as a crit-
ical infrastructure. The disaster of Hurricane Katrina in
2006 reaffirmed the need for this declaration. Among the
lessons learned, it was determined that better planning
and integration of emergency services at all levels of gov-
ernment – national, state, regional, and local – was essen-
tial for public health preparedness. Certain core questions
must therefore be asked: What are our priorities? What
assessments have been made to evaluate these priorities?
Finally, given finite resources, what tradeoffs have been
made in emergency care [3]? In the context of an evolving
crisis in hospital-based emergency care, the potential solu-
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tions to these questions have become even more challeng-
ing, especially given the limitations in federal resources.
Discussion
A basic priority for our country is a unified emergency
response to disasters. The National Response Plan (NRP)
[4] and its successor, the National Response Framework
(NRF) [5] are designed to coordinate the inherent chal-
lenges of America's federalist system, and attempt to bal-
ance power and responsibilities of governance between
national and various state and local interests [6]. The NRP
and the NRF are intended to be a companion to the fed-
eral organizational management template, the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) [7], and to the
Planning Scenarios [8], which are templates for action
during certain catastrophic events (Catastrophic Incident
Supplement [CIS]), so that the nation's collective
responders can be unified in coordinating disaster
responses, locally first and then by scaling up [4,7-9].
Another earlier-recognized priority is the nation's need for
an organized emergency trauma response. Toward that
goal, the Trauma Care Systems Planning and Develop-
ment Act of 1986 was passed to build the trauma system
infrastructure. This was a specific response to a Govern-
ment Accounting Office (GAO) Report in 1986 revealing
that survival rates of rural and urban communities could
be dramatically improved through the systematic coordi-
nation of a trauma response plan [10]. Trauma is a leading
killer and is the primary cause of death for Americans
under the age of 44 [11]. Trained trauma centers have con-
tributed to lowering the rate of death from major injury by
up to 70%[12]. These facts represent the trauma system's
impact on emergency care. Trauma systems also enhance
a community's emergency medical response and surge
capacity during times of disaster.
Whether of natural or human origin, disasters often
involve casualties suffering from extensive trauma, or
those injuries caused by physical force [13]. Injuries
resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological disas-
ters due to human origin are rare. For example, within the
United States alone, there were 31,110 illegal bombings
that occurred between 1983 and 2002. Yet, during that
same span period, the US experienced only two biological
attacks, and no nuclear or chemical attacks [14]. Further-
more, commonly occurring natural disasters, such as hur-
ricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes, also tend to cause
traumatic injuries and typically do not have a biological,
chemical, or radiological component. Therefore, the
national focus on weapons of mass destruction since 9/
11, whether in the media or in the level of federal funding,
appears to be misdirected, especially considering the types
of threats historically experienced [14].
States with a fully functioning trauma system are in a bet-
ter position to respond because essential readiness ele-
ments are already in place. The day-to-day operations of
trauma centers are already structured to meet the strenu-
ous demand of trauma victims by virtue of their expanded
capabilities. Trauma centers have the personnel and
resources necessary to evaluate and treat large numbers of
injured patients on a daily basis. These facilities have
highly trained and specialized staff that are capable of
rapid decision-making, and have the prerequisite relation-
ships and liaisons with emergency medical services, com-
munity hospitals, public health officials, the military and
local government[12]. Transportation assets, memoran-
dums of understanding, and educational programs are
also essential elements already in place. Thus, during a
disaster, trauma centers are better able to scale up their
daily operations irrespective of the disaster mechanism
[12], and should be the foundation of any disaster medi-
cal response [14].
Initially, after the 1986 GAO Report, Congress responded
with grant funding for trauma systems. This funding has
lapsed several times since then [15]. Despite these gaps in
funding after the 1986 trauma act, the federal government
continued to recognize the need for a trauma readiness
system. In 2001, even before 9/11, the Health Resources
and Services Administration (HRSA) had developed a
standard survey for states and communities to self-assess
their trauma readiness [16]. This standardized question-
naire was used in a 2002 study by Mann and colleagues to
assess all fifty states on their trauma needs. These results,
published in 2004, provided an essential baseline for eval-
uating national disaster preparedness. The authors
acknowledged that the urgency created by the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks improved readiness in many states.
The federal need for readiness measures continued. On
December 17, 2003, Presidential Directive 8 "National
Preparedness" (HSPD-8) [17] was issued and outlined, in
areas identified in a Target Capabilities List (TCL), those
priority actions that must be taken to improve the nation's
preparedness [8]. In the TCL, HRSA specifically addressed
surge capacity as a focus and listed it in the majority of its
priorities and critical benchmarks [18]. This presidential
directive followed a March 2003 General Accounting
Office report to the Senate Committee on Finance describ-
ing a nationwide trend of overcrowding in emergency
departments (EDs). The report discussed long patient
waits and increased pain and suffering [19]. Interestingly,
HSPD-8 did not address this issue. Later in 2006, how-
ever, HRSA revised its survey, and supplied benchmarks,
indicators and scoring systems [20]. This report recog-
nized the nation's trauma system capability as a readiness
priority. The problem is that sufficient funding must also
follow.BMC Emergency Medicine 2008, 8:7 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-227X/8/7
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Trauma centers are expensive to maintain. They must
operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and provide highly
trained trauma teams for critical and highly complex inju-
ries. These trauma response teams are comprised of spe-
cially trained nurses; up to 16 physicians who specialize in
a wide range of fields including trauma surgery, emer-
gency medicine, neurosurgery, orthopedic surgery,
anesthesiology, critical care medicine, and radiology.
These response teams are also composed of nurses, respi-
ratory therapists, radiology technicians, blood bank per-
sonnel, and operating roomstaff [12]. The expense and
complexity of this level of readiness is effective and is
appreciated by all public agencies in all states and at all
levels [21]. A trauma team response is also expected by the
clear majority of America's public. A recent study showed
that 61% of the public was confident that they would
receive the best trauma care, and would feel extremely
concerned if that were not the case [22]. Federal funding
for HRSA's trauma-EMS program was funded post-9/11 at
$3.5 million for 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, but cut alto-
gether for fiscal years (FY) 2006 and 2007 [23,24] (See
Figure 1).
Recent literature and formal readiness evaluations at all
levels – local, state, and federal – show that the nation has
suffered a serious decline in surge capacity, despite the
presidential declaration of preparedness criticality.
According to a recent extensive assessment by the Institute
of Medicine, the nation's hospital-based emergency care is
now "at the breaking point"[25]. Some statistics convey a
functioning system. A national inventory of the trauma
system done in 2003 indicated that trauma centers num-
bered 1154 and representing all levels of trauma catego-
ries (Levels I through V) [26]. A 2005 study indicated that
an estimated 69.2% of all U.S. residents could access a
Level I trauma center within 45 – 60 minutes, and an esti-
mated 84.1% were within 45 – 60 minutes of a Level II
trauma center [27].
Unfortunately, these figures do not tell the full story of
what happens inside the trauma center. A different picture
of hospital emergency departments show a characteristic
crisis of overcrowding, boarding, diversions, ambulance
bypasses up to 50% of the time, medical care delivered in
hallways, makeshift examination rooms, and increased
risk of medical error [28]. Such conditions reflect other
figures occurring between 1993 and 2003: a 17% decline
History of federal funding for trauma EMS [24, 25] Figure 1
History of federal funding for trauma EMS [24, 25].
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of hospital beds; a 26% increase in ED visits per year; and
a decline of 9% in hospitals with EDs [29] (see Figure 2).
These conditions were the topic of a 2005 anecdotal state-
by-state survey of expert panels which reported that all
states highly valued their trauma systems, but were con-
cerned that a failure of funding was severely impacting the
viability of those systems and of the states' healthcare
response overall [21].
This nationally recognized crisis is the result of a history
of trade-offs. The underlying causes are multiple, compli-
cated, and reflect decades of public policy and corporate
business decisions, including health care funding sources,
policies regarding insurance, shortages of physician spe-
cialists and trained nurses, and issues of liability and who
bears the costs[12,25,28,39]. Another significant issue is
the lack of training between governments, agencies, and
responders [30,31]. The issue of funding has a deep public
and private organizational history that has been generated
by business decisions, and imbedded in policy assump-
tions and choices at many levels of public health govern-
ance. Managed-care business decisions begun in the
1980's, and spearheaded by cost containment policies,
had a direct effect in cutting inpatient beds to assure and
sustain a high census [32]. Policies designed to reduce
patient treatment time, increase patient throughput, and
maximize profit margins, led to a reduction in hospital
beds and drastically impacted emergency surge capacity
[28]. The average availability of beds for hospitals nation-
ally is 3 to 6% [32]. Restructuring through hospital merg-
ers and closures has also contributed to the reduction in
the number of EDs.
Yet another cost-cutting factor affecting disaster prepared-
ness has been the restructuring of hospitals based on the
business-systems principle of just-in-time (JIT) inventory
management [33]. This form of inventory control restricts
a hospital's ability to store equipment and supplies in
substantial numbers. Surge capacity is dependent on the
"3S's" of staff, stuff, and structure [34]. When the "stuff"
required for day-to-day hospital operations are ordered
on a JIT basis, unexpected surge requirements may not be
met, because on-site storage of supplies and equipment
becomes depleted. EDs must then rely on other resources,
whether from suppliers on short-notice, other hospitals,
or even government stockpiles as a last resort [33]. JIT
inventory management potentially compromises the resil-
ience in a system, challenging not only access to essential
"stuff" required for surge, but also the staff, who must
Trends relating to ED/trauma treatment during period of federal elimination 1995–2000 Figure 2
Trends relating to ED/trauma treatment during period of federal elimination 1995–2000.
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work under additional stress in an already stressed work
environment [35].
The effects of these policy actions place an additional bur-
den on the remaining EDs [28]. Health care insurance
programs and policies have impacted the crisis as well and
have left many Americans unable to afford private health
care coverage. Many of these people are reliant on Medic-
aid to pay for health care or are simply uninsured [12].
EDs and trauma centers have become safety nets for those
who cannot receive treatment elsewhere. This is because
EDs are mandated by the 1986 Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) to treat and stabilize
patients irrespective of their ability to pay [25].
A fairer distribution of insurance stakeholder responsibil-
ity would alleviate the situation. The existing fragmenta-
tion and cost-cutting policies of healthcare expense-
sharing between private insurance companies, managed
care plans, federal Medicare, state Medicaid, state workers'
compensation, auto insurance companies, and various
sources of government funding are ripe for reform [12].
Caught in the middle are EDs and trauma centers which
are left accruing the debt for mandatory treatment to the
underinsured and uninsured [29]. The emphasis by the
federal government to provide funding for a possible
response to a biochemical attack, rather than on the
trauma centers' recognized role in treating serious injuries
from such an attack, is also a serious concern [14].
Specialists who take emergency call are also bearing finan-
cial burdens by treating patients who are unable to pay for
their care. Uncompensated care is a primary reason that
emergency specialists are withdrawing from or declining
to elect trauma center employment. Some ED physicians
report that 55% of their treatment time is uncompensated
[36]. This negative financial impact is due in part to the
extraordinary costs of malpractice liability insurance for
specialists who provide on-call emergency services to
inherently risky, high acuity patients [37]. These EMTALA-
mandated safety net hospitals, and their trauma surgeons,
emergency medicine physician, and other medical and
surgical specialists, become subject to a "dumping
ground" syndrome for those hospitals unwilling to incur
liability exposure from such high-risk patients who
require care [25]. There is a critical national shortage of
trauma surgeons and other specialists who are willing to
take emergency call because it is fraught with disincentives
[37]. Decreasing reimbursement, increasing malpractice
costs and medical liability, and an unfavorable lifestyle
are among the reasons cited [37,39].
The GAO has published several reports on the continued
crisis of recruiting and retaining sufficient nurses, espe-
cially as the current population of nurses continue to ages
and retire, and the Baby Boomers enter and swell the pop-
ulations of the elderly [38]. The issue is exacerbated with
regard to nurses trained in emergency care because of the
stress and burnout rate associated with the practice [39].
Again, cost-cutting policies have contributed to the cur-
rent shortage of nurses and have led to heavy workloads,
difficult staff-to-patient ratios, inadequate wages, and the
increasing use of overtime [38]. In addition, the lack of
nursing educators have dimmed the prospects of alleviat-
ing the staffing shortage in the short-term. Cited are the
high costs of obtaining advanced education, and the diffi-
culty that colleges and universities have in funding cost-
of-living adjustments for their faculty, including main-
taining health care benefits for all of their employees [40].
Federal loan incentives for prospective nurses and nursing
educators could alter the trend, both in the short- and
long-term.
At all levels of our local, regional and national disaster
response plan, there are still problems with a lack of clar-
ity and vision for the future, as well as interagency coordi-
nation of preparedness efforts. Jurisdictional boundaries,
roles, responsibilities, protocol and communication are
all recurring issues in real and simulated disaster
responses. Practice is important- and perhaps even more
important than the plan [41]. However, practice is expen-
sive, and prohibitively so for the emergency departments
and trauma centers because of the lack of funds, available
staffing, and the time required to plan and implement
training [25]. Without planning and practice, however,
the shortcomings of a region's disaster readiness are not
realized. Los Angeles recently learned this through a self-
selected survey. Even without the benefit of a rehearsed
enactment, the surveyed response showed that an effec-
tive response would be confined by a "failure to fully inte-
grate interagency training and planning, a failure to
develop mutual aid agreements, and a severely limited
surge capacity" [30]. The federal government also recog-
nizes that lessons learned from prior practice are essential
for future preparedness. This is why it sponsors an annual
terrorism exercise required by Congress, called TOPOFF,
for the top officials in the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security. Yet, even as the $25 million 2007
TOPOFF exercise was preparing for action in October
2007, Congress was asking for, and had not yet obtained,
the 2005 TOPOFF after action report [31]. Preparedness
cannot benefit if all levels of participation cannot build
upon prior lessons learned.
On the other hand, the comprehensive and compelling
2006 Institute of Medicine report on the crisis in hospital-
based emergency care did have an impact. Congress
recently renewed funding for the Trauma-EMS program
through FY 2012, beginning with $12 million for FY
2008, $10 million for FY 2009, and $8 million for FYBMC Emergency Medicine 2008, 8:7 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-227X/8/7
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2010 – 2012 [24]. However, these figures are woefully
inadequate and unrealistic to remedy a national system of
emergency care that has experienced years of budget-tight-
ening policies that have contributed to the current state of
crisis. This funding also pales in comparison to the FY
2007 budget for the Department of Health and Human
Services which totaled $698 billion [42]. Moreover, the
allocated funds diminish through 2012 and will be dis-
tributed as competitive grants [24]. This strategy will tend
to favor those states with well developed trauma systems
and effectively penalize those with an underdeveloped
trauma system [8].
Summary
In our current healthcare system, emergency departments
have not only become the primary access point for univer-
sal health care, but represent the ultimate safety net for
emergency care [37]. Chronic problems involving ED
overcrowding and staffing shortages have become unsus-
tainable in the long run and are compromising disaster
preparedness efforts. By all measures, the current deficien-
cies in emergency care are a national crisis [43]. At the
same time, the U.S. healthcare delivery system is desig-
nated as a critical infrastructure by Presidential directive
[8]. Emergency care is the essential bedrock for an all-haz-
ards disaster response [32]. Nevertheless, federal funding
for this targeted resource has been suboptimal, both in
consistency and in sufficiency. Currently, the nation is
unable to meet presidential preparedness mandates for
infrastructure readiness, as well as the public's expecta-
tions for emergency care. Federal funding strategies must
therefore be re-prioritized and targeted in a way that rea-
sonably and consistently follows need.
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